








Social Machines and Patterns of Natural Sciences:
On Some Implications of Science and Technolory Studiesl
Abstract: We propose new articulation of the differences between the natural sciences and the social
sciences. Drawing on science and technology studies (STS) we reconstruct the organizational and cognitive
mechanisms of a certain type of natural sciences, one which is referred as laboratory science or high-
consensus,rapid discovery sciences. The key features of those sciences crucial for their cognitive and
engineering success include:
. experimental reproduction of the studied phenomena in the laboratory;
' laboratory interventions and modifications of the phenomena thus evoked and broadly understood
scientific'tinkering';
' attempts to transfer the artificial arrangements developed in laboratory to non-laboratory settings.
The STS perspective not only helps us to explain the differences in status and effectiveness between
the social sciences and the natural sciences. It also allows us to formulate certain generai recommendations
for the development of the social sciences. We attempt to show that sociologists are able to implement
engineering projects in certain domains of social reality, projects involving the creation of closed socio-
technical systems-analogous to the ones which are generated by natural laboratory sciences. We refer to
those systems as'social machines' and the proposed research methodology is called'synthetic methodology'.
Keywords: science, technology, society studies, naturalism-antinaturalism controversy, synthetic metodo-
logy, social engineering
Introduction: A Possible Contribution of STS to the Social Sciences?2
One of the main problems of social sciences methodology is how to explain the
differences between the natural sciences and the social sciences (cf. e.g. Cole 1994a,
I994b; R. Collins 1994; Davis t994; Stinchcombe 1994). Explanations have largely
been suggested within the context of the naturalism-anti-naturalism controversy (e.9.
Mokrzycki 1980; Ossowski L967; Popper 1965). Much attention has been paid to the
low effectiveness of the practical applications of social sciences compared with the
spectacular technological applications of the natural sciences. It has been quite widely
acknowledged that the natural sciences generate not only highly reliable knowledge
1 This researchwas funded by a grant "Contemporary social engineering. Innovations in social sciences
and natural sciences" (N N116 294938) from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education.
2 Several fragments of this text are based on the authors' earlier publications on this subject (Afeltowicz
& Pietrowicz 2008a. 2008b. 2009).
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but also accurate preciictions and effeciive teciraoiogies rvhereas thre social sciences
rnainly generate controversies and unreliable predictions and applicaticns (cf. e.g"
Fnchs 1992,7993; ?{, Collins 1994).
Three types of expianations of this state of aflairs have are recurfent in iiterature
(cf. the slightly different fypology proposed by Zybertowicz 1995:274-276). The first
group of explanations is characteristic for traditional philosophy of science. It is based
on nassumption that the social scientists do not use the proper research mettrods, that
I the ones that are used by representatives of natural sciences. Therefore they are
unable to make quantifications ancl formulate the laws which govern social reality.
The second group of explanations focuses on the ontological properties of social re-
ality and social actors. Firstly, advocates of this group of explanations argue that the
phenornena of interest of the social sciences are far more complex than the objects
and processes studied by naturai sciences (Zybertowicz L995:215). Seconcily, they also
argue that sociai phenomena, as opposed to physical ones, are historically mutable.
For exarnple, sociological explanations intervene in social reality and change objects
of study because social actors modify their behaviour in response to the propositions
which sociologists formulate (cf. Ossowski 1967:254-255; Merton 1948,1968: 447).
Thirdly, they stress that social scientists deal with agents endowed with autonomy,
subjectivity or free will and therefore cannot possibly formulate deterministic laws.
Explanations which point out the ethical problems irnpeding the application of ex-
perimental methods also belong in this group (Zybeftowicz L995:274-275).In other
words, these explanations focus on the various qualitative differences between social
and natural reality. The third group of explanations focuses on organizational and
institutional factors, e.g. the fact that the social sciences are insufficiently funded
compared with the natural sciences. It also points out that the social sciences are
fragmented and multi-paradigmatic, that they have their own specific organizational
culture and that they are submitted to the different rnechanisrns of social control (cf.
Fuchs 1992, 1.993; Collins 1994; Knorr-Cetina L999; Sojak 2004:25-41',61'-70).
These standard, recurrent explanations have been challenged by science and tech-
nology studies (STS) (cf. Knorr-Cetina & IVlulkay 1983; Pickering 1992), and espe-
cially by anthropology of science (cf. Knorr-Cetina 1981; Latour L987; Latour &
Woolgar L979; Lynch 1985). Tiaditional explanations of the so-called social sciences
"lug," "baclcwardness" or "underdevelopment" tacitly assumed the natural science
model formulated by traditional philosophers of science as reference point for so-
cial sciences development (Popper L959; Sneed 1979; Carnap 1995). This model'
focused on science conceptualized as scientific knowledge and intellectual activity.
Meanwhile anthropologists of science and other STS representatives usually concep-
tualizescience as a form of pragmatic actions, e.g.r designing and building of efficient
and reliable research instruments and experimental machines, tinkering with those
devices (comp. the concept of bicolage: Levi-Strauss 1966: t2-22),laboratory nego-
tiations between scientists, generating, processing and comparing paper inscriptions
and other external representations. STS points to those everydayworkbench activities
as factor which are decisive for the cognitive-engineering success of natural sciences.
Hence, STS allow us to approach the problem of the status of the social sciences and
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re-define the clifferences behveen these sciences and the natural sciences in a new
'Nay.
Bruno Latour, a French anthropologist of science, was one of the researchers
who attempted to draw from STS recommendations for cosial sciences . In his paper
"When Things Strike Back: A Possible Contribution of 'science Studies'to the Social
Sciences" (Latour 2000), he argues that social scientists have adopted the philosoph-
ical vision of naturai science methodology. Therefotre, some of them have taken the
naturalist road, striving to imitate patterns of natural sciences, whereas the rest have
tried to build the identity of the sociai sciences in opposition to the philosophical
vision of the naturai sciences. Unfortunatly, neither of these groups has attempted to
revise philosophy of science's assumptions concerning the natural science patterns.
According to Latour, many social scientists have refrained from any attempt to explain
science sociologicaily because too they themselves have perceived socioiogical expla-
nations of practice asrefutation or delegitimization. Therefore they have not tried to
expiain the objective status and effectiveness of natural science for fear of the direct
consequences for the very status of the social sciences which glean part of their legiti-
macy from the authority of the natural sciences. Meanwhile, rather than questioning
the status and objectivity of science, the sociologicai explanations of science devel-
oped within the STS framework founded it on a completely different ground than
those of standard philosophy of science. What is more, by demolishing the philosoph-
ical notions of how the natural sciences function, STS have pointed out the elements
which the social sciences ought to include in their analyses in order to explain social
phenomena. For example, they should not ignore such material and technoiogical fac-
tors as cars, stones, technical infrastructure, or such scientiflcally-represented natural
objects as microbes, global warming or neutrinos, all of which Latour grants status
of actor . This approach has significant consequences, both ontological and political
(Latour 2A0q. Although we think that Latour's proposal a important and although
we acknowledge his understanding of the naturalism-anti-naturalism debate, we wish
to draw the reader's attention to the direction of analysis of social sciences which
STS opened up for us,which Latour and many other gahe not taken. We shall focus
primarily on the role of the laboratory and its expansion.
Thking the findings of anthropology of science as our point of departr.rre, we are
going to suggest several general methodological recommendations for the social sci-
ences. We do not intend to present a one-and-only correct set of rules. What we
want to do is to articulate a few intuitions concerning so-far unexplored develop-
mental pathways for the social sciences and emphasize the contribution of several
projects which are currently being rcalized at the peripheries of the social sciences.
Our objective is to demonstrate that it is quite legitimate, at least from one particular
perspective, to encourage sociologists to emulate the patterns of the natural sciences.
The real issue is not the one which was the focus of the naturalism-anti-naturalism
debate, i.e. "Ought the social sciences imitate the natural sciences at all?"-but the
very model of natural science patterns, either tacitly assumed or explicitly accepted
as the point of reference. The first part of this article sits rvithin the realm of descrip-
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c-f scie:rce and STS perspective. For obvious reasoils, ihis presentation is selective
ancl is subordinated to the priinary objective cf tlris article. in the seconiJ part we
rvili consider the degree to which social scientists are a-ble tc aciopt the rnethods and
techniques of the natural sciences icientif,ed by anthlopoiogists of science. This part
will mark a shift from descriptive to normative methociology (Nowak 2006:23). We
shall strive to demonstrate that sociologists, trike natural scientists ancl engineers, are
abie to construct reiatively complex, synthetic systems and then incorporate these sys-
tems in the social fabric. We shall call such artificial systems 'social machines, (comp.
R' Coilins 1992:191).W=e also wish to show that, in light of STS findings, the practical
application of sociology and social engineering may prove to be one of the decisive
factors leading to the progress of the sociai sciences, including theoretical knowledse.
The Anthropologr of Science Ferspective
The lrnportance of l-aboratories, R.esearch Instruments anti Tbanslation Techniaues
According to STS and the anthropology of science, if we are to understand how science
works we must focus not on theory and abstract reasoning of scientists but on research,
mundane practice. In this approach, the leading role is assigned to the laboratory. La-
tour (1983) dernonstrated that the laboratory cornmunity enables effective reduction
of complexiry of the world and isolation of certain factors. It also helps us to learn how
these factors operate and how to manipulate them. On the other hand, laboratory re-
searchers do not deal with Nature, they deal with purified and processed fragments of
the natural world, (Knorr-Cetina1999:26-32). Many of the phenomenawhich are the
object of interest of physicists or biologists are generated in the laboratory with stan-
dardized equipment and procedures. Particular phenomenon can only become the
object of scientists'cognitive practices if theyhave appropriate equipment or standard
procedures with which to evoke this phenomon reliably, as neerJ be, within the conf,nes
of the laboratory, thus rendering it observable and manipulable (comp. Baird 2A04:12,
l-6: R. Collins 1994; Hacking 1983). This is beneficial frorn the cognitive point of view
because it allows to speed up the research process by multiplying the number of labo-
ratory trials. This way, we can study artificially generated phenomena more easily than
natural objects and processes outside the laboratory which are beyond our control.
Randall Collins points out that by physically manipulating, modifying or finding
new applications for research machines, we are able to generate another new phe-
nornena to study. By tinkering with equiprnent this way we generate new sequences
of derivative research machines which Collins calls "instrument genealogies." These
new machines allow researchers to observe newer and newer phenomena, leading
to streams of scientiflc discoveries. Consecutive generations of particle accelerators
used in high energy physics are fine example (R. Collins 1994:171).
The roie of incription devices and the representations they generate is important
here, as Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1979) pointed out. They feine inscription
device as 'an item of apparatus or particular configuration of such items which can
?'-
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transforin a maierial subsiance into a figuie or diagram wliicir is iiireetly Lisiibi0 by oi:e
of the members of- the office space' (Latour & Woclga r 197 ,L):51). lnscripiions aiiow
researOhers to compare temporally or spatially clistaiit phenomena; combirie variols
representations and identil,v patterns or anorcalies, They al1ow them to capiure the
chaotic world in the form of laboratory diagrams, rables, graphs etc. Without this
translaiion of phenomena into inscriptions, many processes wouid evade scientific
reflection (cornp. Latour 19BB; Gooding 2A0q.
Latour uses the semiotic metaphor of 'translation' to deiine the transformations
r.vhich samples, models or other rnaterials with which researchers work undergo (cf.
Latour 7999: 24-79). The objects of researchers' interest are usually too complex,
iniangible or othetwise cognitively inaccessible. Therefore they must be submitied to
several transformations before researchers can draw any conclusions about them or
compare them (Latour 19B3). The most convenient forms of transiation are paper
inscriptions, drafts, mathernatical rnodels or tables (Latour 19BB; Latour & Woolgar,
1979). They help to make comparisons and draw conclusions. The problem is that
usualiy to register something in so sirnple form one rnust first transform phenomenon
many times (Abriszewski & Afeltowicz 2A07). Of course the aforementioned tech-
niques for the generation of physical effects in the laboratory are examples of such
translation.
Researchers in the laboratory not only make various phenomena cognitively ac-
cessible, they also create settings in which they can be manipulated and transformed.
These are very important operations. In many disciplines scientific knowledge is gen-
erated by manipulating the phenomena under investigation and intervening in these
phenomena so as to discover their new attributes and characteristics (Hacking 1983;
Latour I9B7). Experiments and other laboratory practices are only subordinated to
theory to a certain extent" Experiments involve more than just means of falsifica-
tion, corroboration or confirmation of hypotheses. They are able to autonomously
generate cognitive added value. In the specific laboratory setting research activity
is a combination of diagram analysis, negotiation among researchers, operations
on samples, tinkering with apparatus and physical models, and paper-shuffling (La-
tour L987: 254-257\.
World Laboratori zatian and In strurnen t Expansion
as a Source of the Cognitive-engineering Success of Science
The products of laboratory enterprises, be they technological artefact or scientiflc
facts, function only within those domains which have been modifled in some manner
and subordinated to elements of scientific practice. The spreading of laboratory pro-
cedures, devices and techniques to new areas of reality can be seen as an attempt to
transform the world into one huge quasi-laboratory. Elements or fields of reality are
isolated and submitted to rigorous measuring instruments and laboratory procedures.
For example, many modern technologies in order to function require that laboratory
conditions be expanded to non-laboratory settings. trt is usually impossible to transfer
systems and processes developed during laboratory trials and the process of labo-
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rirlcry tilt"<eiing beyonri the ccnf,nes of seientifi* l:rbcratories Lin'Lji the enrrironmei:i
into which we intend to iransiet Gur technological innovations starts to resen:ble
the laboratory to a certatn extent (Latour 19g7: ZSG). \Nhar this rxeans in practice
is tirat we rnrlst develop the infrastructure i,vhich is essential for the functioning of
our innovations and/or transform it into a closed system, isolatecl frorn environmental
interferences (cf. R.. Collins 1'992). For example, if cars are to function they need
a ramifled infrastructure (roads, parking places, petrol stations, sei-yice points etc.)
but they also need an entire industry which is respcnsible for the excavation, transport
and processing of crude oil (Sojak 2004:243).In otlier r,vords, technotrogies are like
trains. They cannot operate without railway tracks (I-atour 1983: 155):
Facts and rnachiles al'e iike trains, eiectricity, packages of computer bytes or frozen vegetables: they can go
evet}4'here as long as the track along which they travel is not interrupted in the slightest. This ciependenie
and fragility is not felt by the observer of science because 'universaliry;offers them the possibility oi applying
laws of physics, of biology, or of rnathematics everywh ere in prhrciple . It is quite diffire nr in practice. you
could say thai it is possible in principle to land a Boeing 747 anywhire; but try in practice to tund one on 5th
Avenrie in New Ytlrk. You could say that telephorre gives you a universal reaih itprinciple. Try to call from
San Diego someone in the rniddle of Kenya who does not, in practice, have a telephone. you can very well
ciaim that Ohm's law (...) is universally applicable in principle; try in practice to demonstrate it without
a voitmetet, a wattmeter and an ammeter. You may very well claim thai in principle a navy helicopter can
fly anywhere; but try to fix it in the Iranian desert when it is stalled by a sandstorm, hundreds of miles frorn
the aircraft carrier' In all these mental experiments you will feel the vast difference between principle and
practice, and that when everything works according to pian it means that you clo not move an inch out of
well-kept and carefully sealed networks [Latour 1987:2501.
Anthropology of science widened its appeal for laboratorization of the world to
include issues relating to the universality of physical, laws and constants. We can
take it for granted that the laws of physics are universal but in order to prove that
they are indeed so we rnust extend our systern of instrurnents and our practices of
measurement of crucial physical variables. Ohrns, grams or volts can only retain their
universal nature if we have a system of measuring instruments which are calibrated,
standardized and, above all, disseminated by means of the discipline called metrology
(o'connell1993; cf. also Latour 1983: 166-r|7, Latour 187:247-257).
Without the expansion of scientiflc instruments and techniques we cannot appiy
science's technological products. O'Connell gives the following example:
The US Naly has found that it cannot set up an overseas base simply sending ships, airplanes, bullets
and soldiers. None of these can move freely into a new setting unless the Navy firJt sendi the volt, the
ohm, the meter, and other standards ahead to prepare the way. As powerful as military equipment appears
on TV clips, it is extraordinary fragile without support equipment, and cannot move into new setting for
long unless the setting has been prepared by rendering certain variables similar with respect to where the
equipment was produced, and stable with respect to time [o'connell 1993: 1631.
The situation is analogous in medicine, electrical industry, eiectronics, telecom-
rnunications or aviation. For exarnple, due to lack of standard inch rneasurements,
electronic systems produced in the Soviet Union did not fit equiprnent produced
anlivvhere else in the world (Castells 2000: 32). The American armament industry
experienced a similar series of fiascos in the 1950s and 1960s precisely because it
failed to maintain stringent metrological standards (o'Connell 1993).
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As far as disseminaiicrt cf tne pioducts cf srience is curcernetl, mcre iiran iusr
modiiication of physical space is at stake. It is also necessaly to mcriify the sccial p{ac-
tices and the cu.lture witirinr.r'hich the innovation is to function. {t is often necessalv
to deveiop social tacit knowledge resources and essential skills for the operation of
the innovations. Culture is formaited to a certain extent according to the schemas of
natural science laboratories. At the same tirne, however, new institutions clevolve or
old ones are reconstructed. We may say that technological innovations are buiit into
the social tissue or 'socialized, (Brown & Duguid 2003: 86-88, 115).3 we shall limit
our discussion to the simple example of Graham Bell and the telephone he invented.
Before his invention could be diffused, it had to be woven into the fabric of culture
and social oractices. Many potential investors preferred to abide by the traditional
and tested solution, the telegraph, largely becar.ise people did not know how to use
the telephone. Therefore Bell had installed test telephon devices in public places such
as hotel reception desks i,vhere as many people as possible could see them being used
correctly and rnaster the necessary skills (Brown & Duguid 20A3: 37-88).
Blurring the Soundaries Between T'echnological trnnovation and Scientific Prediction
Laboratorrzatron of the world is also the key to scientific success in the domain of
accurate prediction. As anthropologists of science have demonstrated, prediction is
impossible until we extend our laboratories or ollr instruments:
Every time a fact is verified and a machine runs, it means that the lab or shop conditions have been
extended liz some way . (. . . ) Forgetting the extension of the instruments rvhen admiring the smooth running
of facts and machines would be like admiring the road system, with all those fast trucks and cars, and
overlooking civil engineering, the garages, the mechanics and the spare parts. Facts and machines have no
inertia of their own (...); like kings cr armies they cannot travel without their retinues or impedimenta
[Latour 1987:250].
From this perspective prediction boils down to repetition of standardized labora-
tory procedures. What is more, the difference between prediction and technological
innovation is blurred. Both involve transfer of systems elaborated in the laboratory
to the non-laboratory environment and changing certain significant contingencies in
the process. Precise predictions concerning the non-laboratory world are practically
impossible (Latour 1983). Phenomena which have not been submitted to rigorous
research practices and procedures are simply unpredictable-we are only able to
predict those processes which we ourselves have 'disciplined' to a certain extent.
From the perspective of anthropology of science the concept of technological
innovation as knowledge application is equally problematic. This perspective, artic-
ulated time and again in lay discourse and tacitly assumed by many philosophers of
science, posits that scientific theory comes first and technological discoveries follow.
Meanwhile, as STS and several contemporary philosophers of science have demon-
strated, this relation is sometirnes reversed. Quite often technological innovations are
3 Particular attention is paid to modifications and the goodness of fit between technology and society
within another branch of STS, Social Construction of Techology (SCOT), cf. Bijker and Law (eds.) (1992);
Bijker, Hughes and Pinch (eds.) (1997). It is worth mentioning, for example, the work of Wiebe Bujker
(1,995 , 1991) or Donald MacKenzie (1991 , 1998).
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clevelopeci parallei to, indepenctently cf, or in opposition to iireoieticai conceptitlits
(Baird 2004:18).
From Theorizing to Tinkering and Back
We may say that the STS perspective 'disenchants' science. Philosophical concep-
tions traditionally associated research work with abstract reasoning.From the STS
perspective, research practice is often a series of quite simple, 'down-to-earth' ac-
tivities. Science is more than just thinking and writing. One of its key elements is
pragnlatic tinkering. Often enough, instead of focusing on goneral theoretic prob-
lems, researchers strive to develop reproducible systems which can be transferred to
the non-laboratory environment: experimental machines which generate the regular-
ities specified by scientific laws (so-called nornological machines; Carfwright 1999),
technologies which produce the physical or chernical effects described in the text-
books, and last but not least, machines which have technological applications (cf- e.g.
Knorr-Ce tina 1999; Latour 1981). Scientific theory is not completely eradicated from
the model proposed by STS but its role is redefined. Its function is no longer central'
It appears to be rooted in the researcher's tacit knowledge and know-how (H. Coliins
1935) or in labor atory rnachines themselves (Baird 2004). Abstract theory is now the
end product of a long sequence of translations (Latour 1999 24-79), the effect of the
combination of inscriptions and other texts, the reproduction/creation of phenomena
and other transformations.
We must bear in mind, however, that not all natural science disciplines are able
to extend the laboratory setting efficiently or laboratorizetheir objects of study. Oniy
some natural sciences can boast cognitive and engineering successes similar to the
successes of physics or biology. Instead of speaking about the natural sciences in gen-
eral itwould be more appropriate to focus just on those research fleldswhich Randall
Collins called high-consensus, rapid-discovery science (RDS; R' Collins 1994,1998:
523-569). By RDS we mean research areas where cognitive consensus concerning
studied phenornena and methods is considerably high and where, rather than becom-
ing more and more entangled in inconclusive debates, researchers efficiently bring
scientiflc controversies to their closure then attack new problems while viewing the
results of previous accepted research as black boxes (Latour t9B7:1-3) and points of
departure for further research.
Generalizing somewhat, we may say that the natural sciences operate at least to
some extent according to the following scheme:
1. experimental reproduction or creation of phenomena in the laboratory;
2. standardization of experiments so that phenomena can be routinely generated;
3. intervention and modification of the phenornena thus generated and laboratory
tinkering in the broad sense;
4. attempts to transfer the systems artificially produced in the laboratory outside the
laboratory(e.g. in the form of instrurnents, machines or technological processes);
5. laboratorization of the world (rendering non-laboratory reality more similar to
experimental conditions; developing the necessary infrastructure; transforming
. r.'
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social practices and estabiishing essentiai institutions) or/and reproducticn tf
experimental processes within isolated, closed systems.
Tire Social Sciences llrom the Ferspective of Anthropology of Science-
Methodological Recornrnendations
As we already mentioned, the STS description of how science functions differs in cer-
tain important ways from traditional, (post)neopositivist models. Edmund Mokrzycki
(1980) demonstrated that generally the proposals of the philosophers of science did
not meet with much interest among the natural scientists (to whom they were ad-
dressed) although a few significant exceptions can be found (e.g. Hawking 2001: 31).
Meanwhile, social scientists adapted these ideas. One may presume that the imitation
of 'patterns of empirical sciences' were perceived as promise of rapid advancement of
social sciences disciplines. Mrich of social science methodology can be viewed as an
attempt to transfer the patterns of the natural sciences to sociology and related fields.
The problem is thatwhat social scientists actually adoptedrvere not the patterns of the
natural sciences but rather philosophical images concerning how the naturai sciences
function. From the STS perspective, (post)neopositivist epistemology has had a para-
lyzingeffect on the research process. Works on standard philosophy of science usually
contained a number of postulates on how science ought to be practiced rather than de-
tailed, evidenced-based accounts of actual practices. a Philosophers therefore failed
to notice various factors which allow researchers to cognitively grasp phenomena,
and reduce complexity of problems, and they equated science per se with intellec-
tual activity. Hence the tendency to trivialize experimental practice and overestimate
mathematical models. Despite the imputations of standard philosophers of science,
anthropology of science does not question the role of theory. What anthropology of
science does is point out how many transformations and interventions must be carried
out in order to reach this type of abstraction and then be able to relate it to the world.
Social scientists were equally unaware of the role of tinkering and other research
practices. Seduced by philosophy of science, they strove to reproduce their imaginary
model of science. They focused on the construction of theory and instruments without
first reducing the complexity of their object of investigation. They tried to discipline
their object of investigation conceptually, and only conceptually, with the help of
sophisticated instruments and then infer a sociological theory. If they experimented,
they did so in order to reproduce certain real-life phenomena, not to evoke certain
effects or tinker experimentally (Knorr-Cetina 1999: 36-39). Meanwhile, represen-
tatives of natural science RDS do not limit themselves to conceptualizing reality.
They try to master reality in and out of their laboratories with the help of material
interventions and expansion of experimental practices per se.
+ Things only changed in the 1980s when many philosophers of science began to analyze science
empirically and to borrow a number of ideas from sociologists and anthropologists of science. Such
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Although (post)neopositiv.isticte*clencies in sccial sciences methoctoiogy har *
failed this does not mean itrrat we shouid discard the idea cf emulating ihe patterns ol
naturai sciences aitogether. Ey presenting a different picture of the "patterns of lrai-
urai sciences," or rnore precisely, moclels of specific fieids such as RpS, airthropologl'
of science is suggesting rather radical transformation of the existing order of sociai
studies. {f we are to adopi this type of patterns, we must make the experiment onr
key research method, assurning that the purpose of the experirnent is not to represent
but to reproduce, intervene and reduce the complexity of the studied phenomena
(Knorr-Cetina 1999: '36-39).In other words, insteacl of trying to create expelimental
situations corresponding with real-life processes in our research endeavour (appar-
ently this is the dominant approach in the social sciences at present), T e should try
to create artificial social sy.stems in the laboratory or other partiy controlled and
monitored settings. The goal is not to test hlzpotheses but to evoke, reproduce and
manipulate social effects.
This approach can most aptly be calied "synthetic methodology" (Pfeifer & Bon-
gardZ0AT).It is widely applied in robotics, cognitive science and artificiatr inteliigence'
Rolf Pfeifer and Josh Bongard offer the following characteizatiott:
The syntlretic methodology (...) can be chatactetizecl by the slogan "understanding by building'" 
If we
are interested in how .terert ants find their way back to their nest, or how humans walk 
or recognize
a face in a crorvd, we build a system-an artefaci-that mimics certain aspects of the behavior 
we wish to
study (...).This way of proceeding has proved enormously powerful: because 
you have to build somethirg
that actual$ works rn the real world, there is no way of glossing over details, which 
is possible when you
formuiate a theory abstractly [Pfeifer, Bongard 2A07:18)
Therefore, synthetic methodology postulates the need to construct artificial sys-
tems encompassing the behaviour in which we are interested and this in turn should
help us to understand phenomena which really exist. This was the rationale un-
derlying work on artiflcial intelligence from the very start: create a thinking ma-
chine so as to gain a better understanding of intelligence and cognition. Synthetic
methodology can be applied to the social sciences by trying, for example, to build
artificial societies (Epstein & Axtetl L996).If we manage to create functional, rel-
atively stable social relations systems in the laboratory, we will also be able to 
try
to infer about the mechanisms of real-life social processes. Applications of syn-
thetic rnethodology in the social sciences often have the form of computer sirnu-
lations. Rather thun .onstructing organic systems, {esearchers who study 
artif,cial
interligence so as to gain better insight into the nature of intelligence 
and cognitive
processes construct lobots or conduct computer simulations' It is important to re-
member, however, that these simulations do not consist in mathematically 
testing
models of social reality (for an example of such a simulation see Watts 
& Dodds
2007);they consist in application of such methods, as neural networks' 
artificial life
simulations or genetic algorithrns (Billari, Fent, Prskawetx & Scheffran2006; 
Epstein
2005;Gilbert 2004).Although cornputer simulations are an interesting 
developmen-
tal perspective woith rnore detailed discussion' we are only signalling 
their existence
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Syntheiic lnethcciology is basica!1y about seeking to unclerst:rnii scciai reality bir
ttansforming it ancl aboui constructing synthetic replesentatioirs of seiectec'l pro-
cesses" irl many cases saciologists are ahle tc; construct artificial social systems. ?hese
constntctions-we can call thern "social rnachines"-vys specific, closed sociai engi-
neering constructs within which social processes and reiations take place in routine
and predictabie ways. ?hese regularities are partly induced by manipulating material
elements of the environment in which they are taking place. What exactly can these
machines be? R.andall Collins explains this quitewell. He thinks that the problem with
applied sociology is that we do not know how to construct closed social systems. There
are very few closed social systems in the social world. The encounter group is a paradig-
rnatic example of a closed system. Social psychologists know how to rnaintain group
pressure so that group rnernbers quit srnoking or do.not stop dieting. They rnanage to
do so because the group itself is a highly concentrated machine whose purpose is to
channel ernotions and convey emotionai energy to its members. The problem is that
hurnan emotional 'batteries' go dead when the group adjourns, when the system opens
once again to the countless influences of the wider social context (Collins 1992:191).
The encounter group is a rnodel exampie of the social rnachine. It is an artificial,
closed system of roles and relations which functions in a reproducible way. We can
be sure how the rnembers of the encounter group will behave. We can even encour-
age them to behave in particular ways as long as we continue to isolate them and
as long as psychologists channel their emotions. The artificiality and brittleness of
the encounter group is most obvious when it opens to the impact of wider social
processes. These will eventually lead to the group's disintegration. Psychologists and
rnicro-sociologists are farniliar with many processes and outcomes which can only be
evoked, maintained and predicted in "experimental conditions." We must remember,
however, that the products of the natural sciences confront similar limitations. In
order to work, the machines which engineers produce must also operate in controlled
conditions. Coliins says that nearly every success of the natural sciences was achieved
thanks to the construction of closed systems. Thke the automobile engine for example.
The automobile engine is a closed physical space within which selected factors are
allowed to operate: several basic rules of mechanics, electricity and chemistry work
in predictable ways because the equipment has walls which shut out all other process.
The machine usually breaks down because something external has interfered with the
system's functioning (Collins 1992:190; Latour 1983: 155).
The Rote of Environmental Tfansforrnation: The Infrastructure of Everyday Life
In otherwords, machines usually need casing and/or modification of the environment
in which they are to operate. This apparently applies to social machines too. Once
again, both the socio-cuitural context and the physical context need to be modified.
The aforementioned encounter groups are obvious examples. In addition to micro-
group effects and staff supervision of ongoing interactions, their basic condition of
operation is isolation frorn the social context. This isolation is usually ensured by the
-a-
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pirysicai infrastrucrure-separaie roorns i,viili apprcpriate pioxerllics {Fiail it}96) oi
entire iscilzrted therapy centres. {t isworth ccnsidering trow iinportani the infrasiruc-
tr-ire c{the compal}ies they aic modernizing is for the e fforts c;f organization specialists.
In partictilar, how important are the foilowing factors: 1) isolation.from other areas
of practice; 2) various daily rituais which help ernployees to assume their prescribed
roles; 3) the arrailgement of office spac€ which forces people to interact in particular
ways and which also reflects the firrn's arganizational structure;4) technologically ad-
vanced methods of work supervision which enable organizattonai changes and their
effects to be registered. We must not forget, however, that enterprises are just one
typicai form of modern institution and as such they are highly rational systems where
changes can be enforced qurite efficiently and their effects can be monitored. It seerns,
therefore, that the tunctioning of social machines depends on sustainment of cer-
tain boundary conditions, the "infrastructure of everyday life"" Such operations are of
cours€ yet anotlrer example of the transfer of patterns and blueprints developed in the
laboratory to the outside world. The infrastructure of everyday life can include mod-
ifications in the domain of proxemic relations, especially in such areas as technoiogy,
architecture or other elements of material culture. F{ere we find the crucial advantage
of chemistry, physics and other natural science disciplines: nefworks in which their
products can function smoothly have been successively constructed for centuries' New
technological layers have been built on older ones and the achievements of prede-
cessors have been taken advantage of. In many cases the networks in which socio- or
psycho-techniques could function would have to be built almost from scratch.
One good example of socio-technical rnodiflcation of environment is practical
environmental psychology. Let us name, for example, the social engineering ideas
developed by Paco Underhill, the founding presidentof Envirosell.5 On the assump-
tion that the environment has an effect on our behaviour, Underhill decided to study
the effects of spati al organization of shopping malls on consumer behaviour. He
applied the participant observation method in various fypes of shops. He also used
video cameras to register custorner behaviour. The data he collected allowed him not
only to identify general patterns of consumer behaviour but above all to meticulously
structure shopping space (e.g. to plan how to place goods on shelves and hangers
or in shopping windows) in order to maximize profit. Although Underhill tried to
generalize his observations, it is usually necessary to conduct painstaking analysis of
each particular shop and to tinker with the different elements in order to apply his
findings in practice. In other words, although Underhill did not forrnulate any general
rules of social influence, he provided a paradigmatic example of how to adjust the
space of a particular shop so that it becomes a reiatively efflcient profit maximizing
machine (Underhill 2000). 6
s Cf. http://www.envirosell.com
6 We must not forget, however, that environmental psychologists also apply similar tactics to urban
spaces (parks, pro*"rr-ud"r, benches, or streets), public faciiities- or other elements of our 
environment'
Suffice it to mention, in particular, William H.'Whyte (1968, 1980, 19Bg) and his Street Lifu Project'Not
only does Whyte pr"r"of d"tuiled analyses of urban space, he also suggests ways of modifying it (Whyte
too'k un activepari in e.g. the revitalization of Bryant Park in New York).
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'fhe rcie af physicerl infrastructur: anri its ciilnponerlts is extlemeiy irni;ciiani
fi.onl the point olview of the constlr.lction ofsociai *rachines. Socizrl n-iachtnes eunsisl
not only of pureiy social ol culturai eleinents, :rs iireir name may suggest. Accoiding
io actor-nefwork theory (AI'TE Caitron 1991; Latour 1999'), social relatioirs are con-
soiidated by means of technologicai and rnateriai lactors to which social norms and
lunctions are delegated. For example, speed bump (aka'sleeping policernan') embod-
ies norms regulating speed limits and healy key rings which arc attacheci to hotel keys
are meant to prevent absentminded guests from taking their keys with them r,vhen
they leave the building. As Edward Hall demonstrated, the way space is arranged
also enforces specific behaviours and social activities and inhibits others. From the
ANT perspecti',2e, such institutions as firms consist not only of staff, rules and norms
but also of various physical elements. Let us rnention, for exainple, such factors as
the aforementioned proxernic factors or technological surveillance (security control
gates or CCTV to which social control is delegated) but also modern IT (comput-
ers, inforrnation nefworks, telephones etc.) and various traditional; analogue office
media;(sheets of paper, information boards, catalogues, forms, letters etc.) which en-
able communication, collective problern solving, cooperation and action coordination
(Kirsh 2001).7
trn order to draw attention to the technological components of social relations and
processes, one of the authors of ANt the aforementioned Bruno Latour, introduced
the category of hybrid (Latour 1993). Hybrids are combinations of the material and
the technologicatr, the discursive ancl the cultural. F{e also writes about socio-technical
systems in this context (Latour 1999). Of course not only spontaneous and traditional
social relations have a hybrid nature. So do the products of social engineering. The
ANT approach therefore suggests that in order to develop effective socio-technics, one
must focus to an equal extent on people and human relations, and on the environment
itself. Effective socio-technics involve not only culture in the narrow sense but also
socio-technical structures (cf. also Berg 1"998; Bowker, Star, Turner, & Gasser, 1997).
And here lies the difference between social engineering/sociotechnics as manipulating
people and the construction of social machines-
Meanwhile, sociotechnics are marginal in mainstream sociology and if they are
mentioned at all,they are mentioned as a specific type of manipulative techniques. In
order to reconstruct sociologists' approach to sociotechnics and social engineering, we
analyzed the contents of mainstream social science journals (Social Problems, Social
Networks, Ameican Sociological Review, Bitish Joumal of Sociologt, American Jottr'
nal of Sociology, Sociological Methodologt, Annual Review of Sociologt, International
Sociologt, and Sociotogical Inquiry). We analyzed the abstracts, titles and (in many
cases) conclusions of scientific articles published in these journals in L998-2007. We
came to the following conclusions:
1. If sociotechnics is mentioned at all, it is understood as a form of speculative
application of knowledge;
7 Cf. the .,Context Awiire Office" cognitive ethnography project realized with the Interactive Cognition
Lab (UCLA) (Kirsh 2001;http:lladrenaline.ucsd.edu/external/projects/contAware/ethnoStudies/html)'
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2. Stanrtard concepiuaiizations cf sociotecl'rlics and social enginee.ring ignore tiie
icle of infrastructure deveicpment ancl rnanagement of the context lvithin which
sociai interactions take place;
3. They also ignore the roie which non-social factors such as various artef-acts or
technologies play in ihe interactions and processes which social scientists analyze.
I-et us return to the probiem of environmentai transformation, however. Shaping
the material context of operation of social systems is just as important as intervening
in interpersonal relations or in the symbolic-axiological plane. Let us analyze the
New York subway, for example.S In the 1980s the New York City Department of
Transportation decided to test the broken windows theory, clriginally formulatecl by
James Q. Wilson and George Kelling (1982). According to ttris theory, to a certain
extent crirne is the consequeilce of disorder, lack of monitoring and social control.
This can be illustrated by the broken window effect. If a broken window, be it a shop
window or other window, is not replaced quickly this is interpreted as permission to
behave illegally. It is a clear signal that nobody is in charge of the house or shop. It
can aiso be read as a signal that previously existing norms and sanctions have been
suspended. People therefore feel free to behave in analogous ways and also to commit
other crimes such as rnugging, assault or robbery.
The goal in New York was to put a stop to the wave of crime which had overcome
the whole city and especially the subway, In the latter case graffiti were the ana-logue for
the broken windows. Many decision makers felt that to focus on drawings on the wall
in order to control crime was, metaphoricaliy speaking, like scrubbing the deck of the
Titanic before it hit the iceberg. David Gunn, the project manager, decided neverthe-
less that the key to victory in the war on crime did indeed lie in conquering the graffiti
plague. It takes a few days to complete graffiti. First you prepare the surface and put on
a coat of ground paint, then you draw the contours, and finally you draw whatever you
mean to draw. The rnetro personnel therefore had time to locate thewagons on which
new graffiti were to be painted. They kept these wagons in the depot. Graffiti which
had taken three nights to cornplete were rernoved immediately (often observed by the
autlrors) before travellers could sei eyes on them. This was aclear signal that no wagon
devastation was going to be tolerated. The war on graffiti lasted from 1984 to 1990.
The next step in the war on crime was managed by William Bratton, the subway
boss. Bratton focused his attention on fare dodgers and gate crashers. Fare dodging
had become another symptom of the general slacking of social norms. Special plain
ciothes police units were delegated to catch the culprits. Those who were caught were
handcuffed and presented to the public on the platforrns. The system of transportation
to the police station was streamlined. People began to pay their fares and offenders
began to leave their guns at home for fear of being caught at check points. Crime in the
New York subway-both fare dodging and vandalisrn-gradually began to subside.
The number of more severe crimes also dropped immensely. The victory in thewar on










8 Cf. Gladwell 200-q: 135-151.
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NYil chief iirspecic.rr and l,r;rs now tr: apply the methcds pcsitiveiy verifieci ir tirr: ftlctir)
in ihe wtriole city"
The New Y-ork Ciiy subway system, with the changes proposed by Kelling, Gunrl
anrl Brattorl, can be viewed to a certain extent as a social machine or at least a "social
change laboratory." The three actors did indeed tinker with the metro infrastmcture.
They also modified the behaviour of other actors in a way that brought about stable
social effects. They were able to do so both because the metro staff practiced unin-
terrupted surveillance and intervention but also because the underground railway is
a specific space. It is a closed and relatively smal1 environment (compared at least
with entire districts) and was largely under iheir control. Many interventions and im-
provernents couid therefore be introduced. The zrpplied rneans of surveillance were
a source of essential data which could then be used to assess the process of rnetro
modernization.
Two Case Studies: CReiatlDav vs. Gore & Associates
Let us begin with a rather trivial observation: if we want to achieve our desired en-
gineering effects not only must we shape the environrnent but we must also do this
skilfully. Solutions which seem to be feasible enough theoretically often turn out to be
unpractical or even counterproductive. We also have to deal with the problem of how
to transfer favourable socio-technical solutions to new social contexts. We would now
like to demonstrate the difference between an efflcient and functional social machine
and a social machine which proved to be a failure. We shall use two examples: W. L.
Gore & Associates and ChiatlDay. We shall also take this opportunity to demon-
strate the role of technological, rnaterial and proxemic factors in the functioning and
engineering of social organizations.
Case 1: Gore & Associates (based on Gladwell}}l3: L82-192)
W L. Gore & Associatese specialize, among other things, in the production of
membranes inserted into footwear and jackets. These membranes are familiar all over
the world. The flrm was the target of a very interesting social engineering solution.
The organization of the firm is based on the assurnption that its different units will
work most effectively in an intimate climate which will enable direct contact between
employees, a milieu typical for small social groups. Therefore, the traditional pyramid
organizatronal structure was discarded. The company was divided into many separate
and largely autonomous branches. Each branch employed about 100-150 people who
mainly interacted with one another. In such a srnall group it is possible to maintain
the processes which are typical of traditional cornmunities. Employees within each
branch know each other personally and interact informally and directly, i.e. face-
to-face. This interaction mode encourages innovation, good information flow and
very rapid decision execution. The branches are based on first degree social control
9 Cf. www.gore.com
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(Forig6rec){i lyi9i"Tllls madei is in ciireel cpposi{icn to {he bur*i:iicratic sroriels
whic:h have been thcught tc be the most effective rtanagement rnociels at least since
ihe days of hdax Weber.
The work organization modei appiied by W. l-. Gore & Associates was achieved
through a quite simple operation: eacir branch's buildings wele designed in such a way
that they coulcl not house more employees than ihe aforernentioned lirnit. They were
aiso designed in such a way that ernployees were forced to interact frequentiy so as to
facilitate integratior (Gladwell2003: 182-192). Despite its systematic expansion, the
company continued to adopt this policy and to divide its branches into srnaller units so
as te maintain the desired effect. This way, cornpany rnanagers delegaied (cf. Latour
1991 , 1992) some of their functions to the building infrastructure and proxemics (F{all
1965). This is an excellent example of the role which the infrastructure of everyday life
plays in the engineering of social processes. This modelling approach has led to the
development of a relatively autonornous social rnachine. Hopefuily, by introducing
employees to such an environmeilt, we shall soon encourage the desired type of
interactions and work organization with minimal supervisory interference. In other
lvords, social engineering, via the infrastructure of everyday life, is able to encourage
Lebenswell, at least to a certain extent.
Case2: ChiatlDay (based on Brown & Duguid 2003:10-'75)
ChiatiDay undertook an analogous attempt to engineer social reiations by modi-
fying the proxemics and architecture of its offices. This was a weli-known Los Angeles
advertising agency.10 It owes its fame to its many commissions for Apple, including
Apples advertising spot projected during Superbowl in 1984 and its Think Different
campaign. The key to the firms continued competitive power was to be the architec-
tural project for its building designed by Frank Gehry andreahzed in 1985-1991. The
basic assumption underlying the layout was that nobody should have a place of their
own. Instead, on entering the building every employee was to collect a laptop and
mobile telephone and find a seat in the enormous common room (only the conference
rooms were traditionally designed). Managers were to cruise the roorn continually
and make sure that workers were mingling. They split any pairs who occupied the
same seats on two days in succession. All work was to be done on laptops, without
paper. All equipment was to be handed in at the encl of the day on exiting the building'
Theoretically, ernployees were to enter numerous creative relations with represen-
tatives of all sorts of specialities. Within five years the company was on the brink of
bankruptcy. The new owner chucked the previous organization and the spatial office
layout. He returned to more traditional solutions. Several questions come to mind at
this point: Why did a solution which seemed so obvious to so many people prove to
be an organizational fiasco?
First, it ignored the way people use office space, forms, printouts and other ele-
rnents of office equiprnent. Everybody tends to arrange his or her surroundings in away
10 ChialDay and TBAWA WorlclWide merged in I993. Chiai/Day operates in California to this day' It is
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w;ricl-r r,.,,ili aiiow irim/iier eo work (Kirsn i995). x//e deiegat* iunctions rekrting io clie r'-
iive ra;ork to our enviionineni. Meanrvhile , at Chiat/Ila3r en'lployees had'ro reconstruct
their wolkenvironment almost from scratch every day.l{owttnder, therefore , tliat the-v
socn began to protest ancl openiy boycott the superimposed solutions {they smuggieri
iaptops ho*., collecteri forbidden printed materials and notepaper' booked desks)'
Second, it ignored the functions piayed by spatial segregation of employees ac-
cording to speciality. rrl/hen a worker has a problem he or she cannot soive' heishe
simply tui-ns to colleagues at the next desk whcl are working on similar problems' 
This
uppliu, equally rve1l to company strategy, specific commissions' or sirnple problems
r;in ofR.e appliances. A wlil-designed office is abie to produce a strong environ-
rnent conducive to situated learning (Lave & Wegner 1993) and tzrcit learning' 
At
Chiat/Day this type of coliectiu, u.iiuity was impossible because representatives 
of
a given speciality were scattered all over the place'
The rnost serious mistake, however, was that on the one hand the organizers
wanted to develop a collective work model but on the other hand they retained
e xi s t i n g o r g u n t z aLto n a l s t r u c t u r e s -traditional departments 
and special-
ities were not liquidated. The spatial arrangements made close cooperation 
within
work groups and units impossible. At the same time, however, department 
managers
began to send their subordinates to reserve specific desks early in 
the morning' Repre-
sentatives of other specialities were thrown out of more comfortable 
locations' senior
employees threw orrt Sunior employees etc' Instead of a stable structure 
there were
"odl.r, 
time and attention consurning negotiations and quibbles'
To summarise, Chia tlDay tried to engineer a university campus atmosphere 
in
its building, a "melting pot of ideas." students do not have desks of 
their own-it
reasoned. They wander from lecture hall to lecture hall, library 
or club' A11 the com-
pany actually succeeded in doing, however, was to evoke an American 
high school
atmosphere with its typical bul$ing. Innovation was a fiasco because 
the stable re-
lations typical of offlce work were ignored, as were socially embedded 
patterns of
behaviour and probiem solving (also wioent in specific office and 
desk layouts)' The
rnasterminds overlooked the role of such mundane artefacts 
as sheets of paper' Most
importantly, however, they tried to implement an abstract vision 
of social relations





It is worth mentionin gthat,in addition to the ones mentioned 
above' there are many
other examples of socio-technical projects in social reality' 
These projects involve
utilising the properties of the material environment, 
proxemics and the new media
(cf' e'g. Beunza & Stark 2003,2004,20a5;Brown & Duguid 
2003: ta0_I|2; Hutchins
1gg5). Frowever, not all these innovations are the effect 
of interventionby professional
social researchers, e.g. researchers in organi zationtheory 
(Scott r99z)' Many of these
projects are the ideas of specialists in the cognitive sciences' 
ergonomics' human
F
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factct-s or iruina,n-compuie-r iateraction. fdost oi'ih3m, hcwever, seein to be iile eifeci
of spcntane8us, grass-rocts innovations and yoars of institutiona,l evoiution" The best
exarnple if this type of innovation is perhaps the keiretsu arganization, an outgiowth
of iapanese culture (Castells 2087:190*191) and a relatecl forrn of management calleci
Toyotism (Castells 2001: 169-172)" Organizationai soiutions such as these not only
heip to reduce costs (the just-in-time strategy) but also to rnaintain a high levei of
creativify. Most importantly, they are extremely flexible. Just how well they are able
to adapt to crisis situations is evidenced by the Toyota-Aisin Seikai crisis induced
r,vhen one of the key factories in the Toyota production network burned down. i1
Flaving analyzed these case studies and other sirnilar organizatronal innovations
we cail norv riraw some engineering conciusions. Systematic advancement of syn-
thetic rnethodology in the social sciences should assurne the need to capitali ze oll
such practical knowledge, to test it and to try to reproduce model machines in
various socio-cultural contexts. We must remernber, however, that the transfer of
teciinoiogy (inctruding social technology) to new contexts is not a trivial matter. We
cannot do it automatically. More often than not, we rnust adjust it to specific circurn-
siances.
To wind up our narrative we must make one more fundarnental reservation: the
purpose of synthetic methodology is not just to engineer the social fabric, it is also
to gain a deep understanding of it. Engineering practice is organicaily connected to
cognitive practice. As anthropology of science has taught us, prediction and innovation
are two aspects of one and the same process. They have the sarne structure and assurne
analogous techniques and methods. In this article we have adopted an epistemology
based on intervention in the object of study. Doubtless to say, there arevery few social
systems which can be reproduced in traditional laboratories. Perhaps one possible
solution would be to try to view the world as a social science laboratory. We wish
to emphasize that we are talking about deliberate and systematic experimenting
with concrete social relations and structures. Such (methodologically and socially)
uncontrolled experiments on the social fabric have been conducted for a long time.
W-e are talking not only about interventions by organrzatron specialists but atrso about
interventions by natural scientists who, by implementing their innovations, are in fact
changing society profoundly.
Final Conclusions: The Social Machine Metaphor and lts Lirnitations
We have focused in this articie on the analysis of patterns of selected disciplines
of natural science. Thking anthropology of science as our point of departure we
have tried to expiain how certain areas of the social sciences could function (and
1r On 1 February 7997 the entire Toyota keiretsu stopped prodi-rcing rnotorcars when its Aisin Seiki
factory was destroyed in a fire. Aisin Seiki was the sole producer of the brake valves which were used in
all Toyota cars. It would have taken many months to rebuild the factory, However, thanks to the network
organizational structure, Toyota workers and engineers managed to renew production within just a week
by tinkering with existing production lines. They succeeded even though production of the valves required
specialist equiprnent and high-precision execution (Watts 2003: 25 4-260).
'r
solllA[- ii4ACt{{l.T]:S Ai\j D I'tai rER.t{s cF r'#irijRAL sci}ti\,at rrg
sometirnes even do functicn). \Fle have concentrate,j on boili artificiai socizii sysrcms
and the neecl to trailsforrn the contexts in wirich tirese systerns operate. {n a rvay,
'we have suggested turning the existing orcier upsicle clown. Insteaci of assuming thal
social engineering is the point of arrival of the sociai sciences. we have postulateri
that it may be the point of departure. Within the present text, social engineering
is uncierstood no.t as an application of abstract knowledge (this seems to be the
dominant understanding of social engineering and sociotechnics associated with social
influence or ideological activities, cf. Podg6recki 1972; Podg6recki, Alexander &
Shieids, 1996) but as tinkering and modifying the sociai fabric and as a forrn of
cognitive experimentation (Afeltowicz & pietrowrcz,200ga).
Finally we would like to approach the probiem of social machines from a slightly
different vista. So far, we have been using this concept as a heuristic metaphor,
a sensitizing concept according to F{erbert Blumer (7951. Concepts are not in-
nocent, however. Like every metaphor, the "social machine" has its advantages
and disadvantages. The advantages of using this particular concept are as fbl-
lows.
1' The metaphor adopted in this article highlights the fact that there are no easy
applications in the social sciences (or in the natural sciences either).
2. Social sciences'technological applications cannot be reduced to the application of
knowledge and recommendation giving; they should involve constructing a closed,
reproducible system by means of pragmatic tinkering and experimenting.
3' Xf machines are to function, the environment must be reconfigured-an adequate
infrastructure of everyday life must be developed and the isolation effect must be
guaranteed.
4. Implementation of social innovations cannot be limited to the modification of the
symbolic sphere or to purely social practices and relations. It must invol're the
transformation of material cuiture-technology and infrastructure. The role of
the latter in the functioning of social systems has been argued by ANT
If social machines are to function smoothly, personnel interventions are also
necessary, just as they are in natural science products.
The metaphor of social machine construction suggests that sociologists ought to
adopt a pragmatic epistemological stance. Sociology should become a forrn of
social tinkering, at least partly. Researchers should experiment with real social
systems and their infrastructure. But they should not try to design ready-made so-
cial relation systems. Instead of applying theory, they should introduce pragmatic
corrections and try to create reproducible mechanisms.
This metaphor can also be misleading.
Many people may associate this metaphor with a "ruthless social machine" or the
"cogwheels of totalitarian system." This is certainly what happens in the case of
many of the "inventions" of modern rationalized society-military institutions,
bureaucratic structures, very hierarchical enterprises, mental hospitals (but not
only mental ones), prisons, boarding schools etc. (Goffman 1961). Flowever, many
contemporary social machines are as far removed from these patterns as possible.
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spaces designed by environmentai psycliologists' These 
arc tloi sociai machines
which are iike refrigerators whose goal iS to enforce 
q,1 "fteeze" the practices'
relations anci beliaviours of social actors within certain conflgurations" 
Rather'
they are subtle interventions and operationswlrose goal 
is to generate appropriate
bor,indary conditions and isolate interfering factors'
2. Thefact that we are dealing with machines does not mean that we 
can build them
into every social context. As we know, sTS questioned 
the vision of the universal
applicability of the products of the natural sciences' 
Analogously' we cannot sim-
ply transfer social machines into new surroundings and 
expect them to function
smoothly. This does not mean, however, that such transfer 
is irnpossible because
of culturai {actors. Once again we neeil to resort to 
engineering tinkering-we
must adjust out'innovations to specific' concrete 
contexts'
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